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MARKETING OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PUBLIC
PENSION PLANS: ACHIEVING TRANSPARENCY
THROUGH LOBBYING REGULATIONS?
ABSTRACT
In the past decade, public pension plans and their outside investment
advisers have been at the center of scandals involving bribery, blatant asset
mismanagement, and widespread corruption. In response to this corruption,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and many state legislatures
have adopted laws addressing “pay-to-play,” the custom of making political
contributions or other payments to state or local officials in return for an
opportunity to “play”—invest the public pension fund money. This Note
examines certain pay-to-play legislation enacted by state and local governments seeking to regulate investment advisers and public pension plans
through the promulgation of lobbying regulations. As such, the Note will
provide an in-depth analysis of the laws arising from the original governmental bodies to create this type of pay-to-play: New York City and the
State of California. The Note will examine this trend in other states and
look at another layer of regulations, coming not from states, but from public
pension plans themselves. Finally, this Note will discuss the transaction costs
associated with this trend and propose a compliance protocol for investment
advisers, laying out the most efficient method by which investment advisers
can attempt to comply with the multitude of pay-to-play regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, public pension plans and their outside investment
advisers have been at the center of scandals involving bribery, blatant asset
mismanagement, and widespread corruption.1 Public pension plans are
among the largest investors2 and, in the aggregate, control over $4.8 trillion
in assets.3 Given their size, importance, and “tens of millions of people who
rely” on public pension plans, any corruption within or affecting public pension plans is a serious issue that must be addressed.4
In response to corruption, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and many states’ legislatures have adopted laws addressing “pay-toplay,” the practice of exchanging political contributions or other payments
to state or local officials for an opportunity to “play”—manage and invest the
public pension fund money.5 More specifically, pay-to-play refers to various
arrangements by which investment advisers may seek to influence the award
of advisory business by making or soliciting political contributions to government officials charged with awarding such business.6 The SEC’s pay-toplay rule, SEC Rule 206(4)-5,7 regulates SEC-registered investment advisers’
political contributions to candidates, elected politicians, commissions, and
1

See, e.g., Imogen Rose-Smith & Ed Leefeldt, Shadow Lands, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Oct. 2009, at 44 (describing a six-month investigation into the “dark
underworld” of public pension funds by way of backroom deals mixing political
patronage, vast amounts of assets, and the lack of effective regulation that creates a
corrupt situation); Calpers Disclosure of Placement Fees Paid to Ex-board Member,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001
&sid=a2MI8a3PJ.jk (describing Institutional Investor’s findings about the public pension
plan allocation process as “everyone must pay-to-play .... This sinister game enriches those
who play—the hedge fund and private equity managers, consultants, placement agents,
pension officials and politicians—at the cost of taxpayers and pension beneficiaries.”).
See generally Public Employee Retirement Systems, AFSCME, http://www.afscme.org
/union/retirees/resources/retiree-tools-and-information/public-employee-retirement-systems
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (listing all public employee retirement systems).
2
Table: The 2012 largest retirement plans at a glance, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS
(Feb. 6, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120206/INTERACTIVE/120
209913/table-the-2012-largest-retirement-plans-at-a-glance.
3
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2013
82 tbl.L.118 (Dec. 9, 2013).
4
See, e.g., Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 42.
5
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c)(3) (West 2013); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-211(c)(1) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.90 (West 2013); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5
(2013) [hereinafter SEC RULE 206(4)-5].
6
SEC RULE 206(4)-5.
7
Id.
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government committees. Importantly, SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt
existing state and local pay-to-play rules.8
As SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt state and local rules, investment
advisers marketing to public pension plans across states are left with the task
of complying with an assortment of varying and inconsistent regulations.9
This Note focuses on jurisdictions that have developed laws requiring investment advisers to register as lobbyists if they interact in certain ways
with public pension plans. For instance, New York City and California require investment advisers to register as lobbyists and comply with the reporting requirements of relevant lobbying laws if they solicit investments
from government pension plans.10 Lobbying is defined by section 3-211(c)(1)
of New York City’s Administrative Code as an attempt to influence “any
determination made by ... an officer or employee of the city with respect to
the procurement of ... services ... including ... the solicitation, award, or administration of a contract ... involving the disbursement of public monies.”11
This lobbying definition has been interpreted to include the marketing of
investment advisers to government pension plans.12 Consequently, investment advisers may be subject to the registration requirements and regulations governing lobbyists.13 This lobbyist definition does not comport with
traditional conceptions of investment advisory firm employees and the role
of legislative lobbyists.14 The new lobbying laws also create additional
compliance burdens for investment advisers, public pension plans, and
8

SEC Release No. IA-3043, File No. S7-18-09, Political Contributions by Certain
Investment Advisers 146 (July 1, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/ia-3043.pdf
[hereinafter SEC Release No. IA-3043].
9
SEC RULE 206(4)-5.
10
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c)(3); N.Y.C, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1).
11
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1)(iii).
12
Letter from Patrick Synmoie, Counsel to the City Clerk, Office of the City Clerk of
New York City (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/cc-lobbying
lawletter.pdf (claiming that certain financial services firms doing business with New York
City’s pension funds may be required to register as lobbyists).
13
Id.
14
Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 149 (1993).
The very word ‘lobbying’ unfailingly evokes images of furtive influence
peddlers lurking in the lobbies outside congressional meeting places,
awaiting their opportunity to pounce on defenseless elected officials and
‘buttonhole’—the catchword of the lobby critic—them until they agree,
however reluctantly, to sacrifice the public welfare to appease whatever
special interest the lobbyist happens to represent that day.
Id. See generally U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618–19 (1954) (discussing the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act and that it applies to persons whose principal purpose is “[t]he
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.”).
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enforcement agencies by broadening lobbyist definitions and expanding
reporting requirements to investment advisers. As a result, these new lobbying laws unnecessarily complicate methods of monitoring and compliance
by trying to liken investment advisers to traditional lobbyists.15
Labeling investment advisers as lobbyists is counterintuitive and unduly
burdensome on investment advisers, placement agents, and public pension
plans; however, this legislation is unlikely to be amended or overturned.
This Note examines certain pay-to-play legislation enacted by state and local
governments that target the suspect arrangements by which investment advisers may seek to influence the award of public pension plan assets through
political contributions. As necessary background, the Note will provide an
in-depth analysis of the laws arising from the original governmental bodies
to create pay-to-play legislation regulating investment advisers marketing to
public pension plans: New York City and the State of California. Examination of New York City and California’s lobbying laws focuses on their clarity, relevant exemptions, efficiency, reporting requirements, and penalties.
Through this review, each jurisdiction’s strengths and weaknesses become
readily apparent. Further, this analysis demonstrates the provisions that best
achieve the purpose of regulating investment advisers, who seek investments from public pension plans.
Following the comparison of the New York City and California prototypes, the Note will provide a sampling of recent state statutes that attempt
to regulate pay-to-play issues in their own way. After addressing these state
laws, the Note will examine another layer of regulations, coming not from
states, but from public pension plans themselves, illustrating the evergrowing complexity in this area. These self-imposed regulations govern
the interaction between investment advisers and public pension plan officials. These many levels of regulations—federal, state, local, and pension
plan—create a landscape so wrought with mandates that compliance becomes increasingly complex.
The multiple sources of regulation create uncertainty, resulting in high
transaction costs and inefficient disclosures. First, it has become difficult for
investment advisers to fully understand and keep up with the regulatory
environment. This uncertainty in the law results in increased legal and compliance fees, and therefore increases transaction costs.16 Second, the enhanced
15

Thomas, supra note 14, at 154–55 (describing the reporting requirements of the
Lobbying Act, which require traditional lobbyists to “divulg[e] the minutiae of contributions and expenditures....”).
16
See generally Gary Slater & David A. Spencer, The Uncertain Foundations of
Transaction Cost Economics, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 61, 61 (Mar. 2000) (“Uncertainty is a
core assumption in transaction cost theory.”).
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reporting requirements require information specific to traditional lobbyists
and not that of investment advisers, thus creating increased reporting requirements that are not as applicable to investment advisers marketing to public
pension plans. Third, the increased reporting requirements necessitate an increase in expenditures and resources by public pension plans to monitor the
influx of lobbyist reports and other immaterial information. Thus, these laws
create uncertainty and increase reporting requirements, while still failing to
enhance transparency in the public pension plan allocation process.
Due to these resulting transaction costs, regulating investment advisers
under the umbrella of lobbyists is not the most efficient solution to increase
transparency in investment adviser and pension plan interactions. Rather,
these regulations dilute the flow of meaningful information and increase
transaction costs to the detriment of public employees: the intended beneficiaries of public pension plans. While the current regulatory system is
inefficient, it is unlikely to change. Therefore, after analyzing the transaction
costs associated with these regulations, this Note will propose a compliance
protocol for investment advisers, laying out the most efficient method by
which investment advisers can attempt to comply with the multitude of
pay-to-play regulations.
I. PENSION PLAN CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGINS
OF PAY-TO-PLAY LEGISLATION
A. Overview
Pay-to-play legislation concerning investment advisers and public pension plans, and the promulgation of similar laws across the country, is the
result of highly publicized scandals showcasing high-stake bribes, disregard
for rules, inefficient regulatory oversight, and blatant abuse of government
power. Due to their significant amount of assets,17 managing public pension
plans assets is highly coveted and sought after among investment advisers.18
These conditions inevitably create an environment prone to corruption.
Investment advisers marketing to public pension plans have become subject to government pay-to-play regulations. The public pension plans’ employees, who are charged with managing pension plan assets, are considered
government officials under certain lobbying laws.19 These government employees often have the sole discretion to select investment advisers, who then
make investment decisions for government public plans.20 As governmental
17

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
SEC Release No. IA-1812; File No. S7-19-99, Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers (Aug. 5, 1999), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia-1812.htm#foot36.
19
See, e.g., Letter from Michael A. Cardozo, N.Y. Corporation Counsel, to Michael
McSweeney, N.Y. City Clerk 1 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads
/pdf/placmentagents.pdf.
20
Id. at 1–2 (discussing the governance structure of New York City’s five pension plans).
18
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officials are authorized to allocate a certain amount of public pension plan
assets to alternative investment advisers, such as hedge funds and private
equity funds, this allocation of government money qualifies as government
activity. Therefore, marketing by investment advisers to public pension
plans, in some jurisdictions, qualifies as an activity that is subject to lobbying regulations because such marketing necessarily includes engaging with
government officials with respect to government activity.21
Pension plan governance structure has been ineffective in mitigating
scandals stemming from bribery.22 In New York City, only one elected official is responsible for managing the pension plans,23 whereas some states,
such as California,24 have a board of trustees who are appointed, and thus are
considered elected officials.25 Pension plans in both jurisdictions, however,
have been the subject of scandals.26 This dynamic is problematic because it
reveals that governance structure is not effective, and rather, elected officials
allow outside factors to influence their selection process and reward contributors with access to public pension plan assets.27 Scandals surrounding misallocation and corruption of pension plan assets highlighted the need for
accountability and transparency in the government pension plan allocation
process and triggered the onset of the regulations analyzed in this Note.28
While regulations are necessary to enhance accountability in the government pension fund allocation process, these regulations should be scrutinized and analyzed for their effectiveness because the management of these assets affects taxpayers and beneficiaries of the retirement systems, as
well as publicly held companies29 and the securities markets.30
21

Dealbook, Hevesi Is Expected to Plead Guilty in Pension Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/hevesi-is-expected-to-plead-guilty-in-pen
sion-case-2/ [hereinafter Dealbook].
22
See infra Part I.B.
23
Op-Ed., It’s Time to End Pay For Play, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 2009, at A32.
24
Id.
25
See generally id. “Whether New York should change its sole trustee arrangement
needs to be examined. What doesn’t need to wait is campaign financing. Not needing millions of dollars to run reduces the temptation to abuse the office.” Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1.
28
For instance, Alan Hevesi, former New York state comptroller, pled guilty to a felony
count for taking $1 million in gifts, including foreign travel arrangements and campaign
contributions, from a California money manager. Hevesi, as sole trustee of the pension fund,
granted $250 million of New York pension assets to the California money manager. See
Dealbook, supra note 21.
29
SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 5–13 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Jill E.
Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension
Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 317 (2008)).
30
SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 5–13 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
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B. Scandals Illustrate Need for Transparency
Public pension funds have certain key elements that render them susceptible to corruption: they control a significant amount of assets, they are a
highly coveted investment resource for investment advisers, and the officials
and regulatory entities charged with their oversight lack sufficient resources.
Corruption across the country involving government pension plans and investment advisers demonstrated the need for increased regulations, oversight,
and transparency.31 New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF),
a state government pension plan, became mired with controversy and served
as the catalyst to create pay-to-play regulations that require investment
advisers to register as lobbyists.32 Alan Hevesi, former New York State
Comptroller, sought investments from other public funds for a private equity
fund based in California run by his friend and political campaign supporter,
Elliott Broidy.33 Through his wife, Elliot Broidy made thousands of dollars
in political contributions to officials with oversight authority of public funds,
including Hevesi.34 Hevesi, as sole trustee of the pension fund, granted $250
million of New York pension assets to the California money manager.35
Ultimately, Hevesi pled guilty to a felony count for taking $1 million in gifts,
including foreign travel arrangements and campaign contributions.36 Further, other investment firms have agreed with New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo to pay fines in connection to fees paid to third parties, who
acted as conduits and solicited business with NYSCRF.37
As a result of the scandal, when the succeeding New York State Comptroller took office, increasing transparency and heightening anti-corruption
efforts became a top priority.38 NYSCRF, under the control of Comptroller
FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2009, 78 tbl.L.119 (Mar. 11, 2010)). One
and a half trillion U.S. dollars is invested in corporate equities. Id.
31
Lobbyist Regulations’ Impact on Investment Managers—California, New York and
Beyond, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.sidley.com/files/News/a6105e8a
-8770-44ec-9341-87cdaab80ac4/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7fa3c04a-6373-41d4-5ef
-d272250eaa53/Investment%20Funds_02.01.11_Lobbyist%20Regulations%20Impact.pdf
[hereinafter SIDLEY AUSTIN].
32
Id.
33
Dealbook, supra note 21.
34
Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1.
35
Dealbook, supra note 21.
36
Id.
37
SEC Looked to Muni Rules in Writing Placement Ban, PE MANAGER (Aug. 8, 2009),
available at http://www.privateequitymanager.com/Article.aspx?aID=0&article=4 4800.
38
Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Comptroller, Office of the N.Y. State
Comptroller, Statement on Hevesi Sentencing (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www
.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/apr11/041511.htm (“Since taking office, I have changed the
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Thomas DiNapoli, adopted very conservative pay-to-play rules. These rules
are not state regulated, but rules adopted by the NYSCRF.39 First, NYSCRF
banned pay-to-play practices, which prohibits NYSCRF from doing business with any investment adviser who has made a political contribution to
the State Comptroller or a candidate for State Comptroller.40 The ban parallels SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and its subsequent regulations. This ban lasts for
two years from the date of the contribution.41 Second, NYSCRF bans the use
of placement agents, registered lobbyists, and other paid intermediaries soliciting investments.42 A placement agent or a paid intermediary is a firm or
person hired by investment advisers to connect investment advisers with
potential investors. A placement agent or paid intermediary’s pay is usually
contingent upon the successful matching of investors with investment advisers. The ban also includes entities compensated on a flat fee, a contingent
fee, or any other basis.43
A scandal similar to NYSCRF and subsequent enactment of pay-toplay legislation occurred in California. A former top official of California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), Frederico Buenrostro,
was charged by the SEC with defrauding the pension plan into paying $20
million to a private equity firm represented by his friend.44 In this case,
CalPERS, was “victimized by its own board member in a clever pay-to-play
scheme,”45 in which Buenrostro conspired to scam “the pension fund into
paying millions of dollars in fees for a $3 billion investment” deal.46 The
SEC successfully argued that Buenrostro created documents to make Apollo
Global Management, a private equity firm, believe that CalPERS had approved
the payments to Buenrostro’s friend.47 The scheme revealed inadequacies
way the pension fund does business so history cannot repeat itself. I have banned placement
agents and pay-to-play practices, and I have increased transparency in pension fund transactions. But there is more that can be done.”).
39
Pension Reforms, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, https://www.osc
.state.ny.us/pension/reform.htm# (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
These rules will be discussed in depth in Part III.B.1.
44
Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Charges Former Calpers Chief with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/s-e-c-files-fraud
-charges-against-former-calpers-chief/.
45
Today's Calpers Scandal Only Latest Chapter in Story of Corruption in the Public
Fund Industry; Magazine Calls Lawmakers to Action to Eliminate Pay-to-Play, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5
xSGl3ZJBuQ.
46
Karen Gullo & Michael B. Marois, Ex-Calpers CEO Buenrostro Indicted Over
Apollo Investment, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2013-03-18/ex-calpers-ceo-buenrostro-indicted-over-apollo-investment.html.
47
Id.

252

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:243

in the pension plan’s asset allocation process. As a result of the scandal,
CalPERS co-sponsored a bill that increased disclosure requirements and
bans on payments to intermediaries and lobbyists.48
Pay-to-play scandals across the country reveal that corruption and bribery are national and systemic problems. In Ohio, the Chief Financial Officer
of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation misallocated $19 billion due
to bribes and “gifts” from placement agents.49 Some of these “gifts” came in
the form of payments towards his child’s college “tuition and use of a luxury condominium in Florida.”50 This scheme illustrates the craftiness and
extent to which placement agents and money managers will go to attain investment management positions from public pension plans.51 As “pay-toplay casts its shadow nationwide”52 and similar scandals occurring in Texas
and New Mexico further demonstrate, the investment adviser and government pension plan relationship is conducive to corruption.53
C. Overview of Pay-to-Play: SEC Rule 206(4)-5
In July 2010, in response to the scandals discussed above, the SEC
adopted Rule 206(4)-5, pay-to-play regulation that bans political contributions by SEC-registered investment advisers to candidates running for positions that could influence the allocation of public pension funds.54 These
regulations were adopted to regulate how investment advisers interact with
government personnel.55 Pay-to-play rules apply to government pension plans
because certain pension plan personnel are considered government officials.56
Thus, the SEC pay-to-play rule sought to regulate the ways in which investment advisers, or any other person, doing business with public pension plans
may operate with respect to solicitation of investment opportunities.
48

Cuomo’s Pay-To-Play Saga Comes Full Circle, PE MANAGER (May 2, 2011),
available at http://www.privateequitymanager.com/Article.aspx?aID=0&article=60825.
49
Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 41.
50
Id. at 42.
51
Id. at 42.
52
Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 41.
53
See, e.g., James Drew, State Veils Peddling of Pension Investments, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, July 22, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 15347567 (discussing a scandal in Texas);
Rose-Smith & Leefeldt, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing a civil suit filed in New Mexico, in
which “the former CIO of the $8.5 billion New Mexico Educational Retirement Board …
has risen from obscurity by filing two ‘whistle blower’ lawsuits, both alleging that allies of
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson had pressured the ERB into making investment
decisions ‘tainted by political considerations and contributions.’”).
54
SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 26–29, 202.
55
Id. at 11–19.
56
Id. at 6. See also supra Part I.A (explaining why the marketing of investment advisers
to government pension plans is considered government official activity).
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The SEC Rule 206(4)-5 contains three significant prohibitions: (i) a twoyear prohibition on any adviser providing compensated services to a government entity following a political contribution to certain officials of that
entity;57 (ii) a prohibition on using third-party solicitors;58 and (iii) a prohibition on bundling, coordination, or other organizational efforts by advisers to solicit political contributions for certain officials of a government
entity to which the adviser is seeking to provide services.59
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 contains certain exceptions that make the pay-toplay regulations more appropriate for investment advisers,60 particularly the
de minimis exception and the exception for new employees.61 Nonetheless, if an investment advisor falls under one of these exceptions, SEC
Rule 206(4)-5 contains a requirement to report these exceptions by amending the annual ADV.62 The de minimis exception creates an exception for
contributions under $350.63 This exception applies to officials that the covered associates64 are entitled to vote for at the time of contribution at each
election. A separate $150 de minimis exception applies to officials that the
covered associates are not entitled to vote for at the time of the contribution.65
The exception for certain new employees excludes employee contributions
more than six months prior to becoming a covered associate.66 If investment
57

SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(1).
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(i). Third-party solicitors are not regulated persons and therefore not subject to pay-to-play restrictions on political contributions.
59
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(a)(2)(ii).
60
SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 195–96.
61
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1), (b)(2).
62
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(3)(ii). See generally Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“Form ADV is the
uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and state securities authorities. The form consists of two parts. Part 1
requires information about the investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its
employees.... Beginning in 2011, Part 2 requires investment advisers to prepare narrative
brochures written in plain English that contain information such as the types of advisory
services offered, the adviser’s fee schedule, disciplinary information, conflicts of interest,
and the educational and business background of management and key advisory personnel
of the adviser.”).
63
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1).
64
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(f)(2) (defining “covered associate” as: “(i) any general partner,
managing member or executive officer, or other individual with a similar status or function;
(ii) any employee who solicits a government entity for the investment adviser and any
person who supervises, directly or indirectly, such employee; and (iii) any political action
committee controlled by the investment adviser or by any of its covered associates”).
65
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(1).
66
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(2). This exception is narrowly construed and states that it does
not apply to employees, who after becoming a covered associate, solicit clients on behalf
of the investment adviser.
58
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advisers choose to rely upon the above exceptions, they must disclose the
contributions that fall under the exceptions by amending the Form ADV.67
The reporting requirement through the Form ADV implements additional
restrictions that limit reliance on this exception for many investment advisers and adds another layer of transactional costs.68
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 does not preempt existing state and local pay-toplay rules and does not impose additional reporting requirements. In fact,
the only SEC reporting requirement with regard to pay-to-play rules is a requirement to update the Form ADV amendments.69 SEC Rule 206(4)-5 is
silent regarding the requirement for investment advisers to report or register
with localities and states disclosing campaign contributions. Because the
rule does not preempt state and local pay-to-play rules, advisers not only
must comply with general pay-to-play rules, but also with state and local
regulations applying to investment advisers soliciting plans from public pension plans. The enactment of state and local lobbyist regulations fills the
void of disclosure, as discussed below, but the variation and lack of guidance
creates increased transaction costs, and skews market efficiency. Furthermore, these regulations will lead to a flood of information and materials that
will more than likely overburden the regulatory agencies and public pension
plans tasked with their review.70 As a result, the regulations achieve an opposite effect, in which the regulatory agencies and pension plans are clogged
with inapplicable information that will likely hinder their review of truly
material issues.
II. ORIGINS OF LOBBYING DEFINITIONS TO INCLUDE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS MARKETING TO PUBLIC PENSION PLANS
As discussed above, scandals involving public pension plans and investment advisers revealed the rampant abuse of power and the innovative
67

Form ADV, supra note 62.
SEC Rule 206(4)-5(b)(3)(ii). (“In any calendar year, an investment adviser that has
reported on its annual updating amendment to Form ADV (17 CFR 279.1) that it has more
than 50 employees is entitled to no more than three exceptions pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(i)
of this section, and an investment adviser that has reported on its annual updating amendment
to Form ADV that it has 50 or fewer employees is entitled to no more than two exceptions
pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.”).
69
Form ADV, supra note 62.
70
See SEC Release No. IA-3043, supra note 8, at 162 (discussing the recordkeeping
requirements of the SEC’s pay-to-play rule and the resulting burden on investment advisers).
While the SEC Release explicitly addresses whether the pay-to-play rule complies with the
Paperwork Reduction Act, the state and local laws do not make reference to the Paperwork
Reduction Act or any parallel state law. The SEC Release only addresses the burdens of the
SEC pay-to-play rule. This Note looks beyond SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and addresses the multiple other levels of regulations imposed on investment advisers, illustrating that, taken as a
whole, pay-to-play regulations on investment advisers are truly over-burdensome.
68
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(yet illegal) methods used to win control of public pension plan assets.
While SEC Rule 206(4)-5 bans certain pay-to-play practices, it does not impose enhanced reporting requirements to increase transparency. This section
will analyze the laws of the first two jurisdictions to address pay-to-play
through legislation, New York City and the State of California. New York
City is particularly important because New York City is the center of global
finance71 and thus sets the tone for market norms. The State of California
has one of the largest public pension funds,72 and thus has a strong vested
interest in its regulation. The starting point for regulations by both New York
City and California is an enlarged definition of the term “lobbyist” so that
certain investment adviser activities related to public pension plans fall within
its scope.73 This section will analyze each jurisdiction’s definition of lobbyist,
registration and reporting requirements, lobbyist prohibitions, and penalties
for noncompliance. Through analysis of both jurisdictions, their differences
in approach become apparent. After this introduction to each jurisdiction’s
definitions and regulations, a side-by-side comparison of select provisions
of the New York City and California prototypes illustrates the problematic
ambiguities and conflicts among the various laws.
A. New York City
1. Lobbyist Definition
New York City implemented regulations to increase oversight and
transparency that ultimately require certain investment advisers to register
as lobbyists. Investment advisers who market to New York City pension
plans74 now fall within the scope of New York City’s enlarged definition
of lobbyist. Section 3-211(c)(1) of New York City’s Administrative Code
defines lobbying as any attempt to influence “any determination made by ...
an officer or employee of the city with respect to the procurement of ... services ... including ... the solicitation, award, or administration of a contract ...
involving the disbursement of public monies.”75 The definition excludes
71

Alison Fitzgerald, New York Eclipses London as Financial Center in Bloomberg
Poll, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001
&sid=aEC0OYmvvcZM.
72
SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 1.
73
Id. at 7.
74
New York City’s pension plans are as follows: (i) the New York City Employees’
Retirement System (NYCERS); (ii) the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF); (iii) the
New York Fire Department Pension Fund (FDPF); (iv) the New York City Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS); and (v) the New York City Board of Education Retirement System
(BERS). See, e.g., supra note 19.
75
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1) (2014).
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“prospective contractors who communicate with ... city contracting officers
or employees in the regular course of ... the contractor selection process.”76
This exception is limited to personal communications or appearances by
either an employee charged with the responsibilities related to contracts or
persons who provide technical or professional services; it does not apply to
those in the regular course of business.77 The law also strictly forbids exempt
individuals from making contact with “elected officials or their deputies”
during the selection processes.78
New York City’s definition of lobbyist leaves many ambiguities, particularly with respect to whether it includes investment adviser firm personnel.
Although the provisions of the New York City law could be interpreted to
exclude investment sales activities directed at pension funds, certain relevant
governmental authorities, including the Office of the City Clerk and the
Corporation Counsel, stated even normal investment adviser activities that
involve any communication with public pensions funds could require registration under the City’s lobbying law.79 Further, the lobbying law applies to
third-party placement agents and to employees of investment firms when they
attempt to influence government investment decisions.80 There is a lack of
clarity and guidance regarding what is meant by “attempt to influence.”81
Other ambiguities arise from Advisory Opinions issued by New York City’s
Lobbying Bureau,82 which also suggest “normal sales activities could ...
require[] registration under the City’s law.”83 As described below, among
other regulatory burdens placed on investment adviser personnel, lobbyist
regulations create additional registration and reporting burdens. These reporting burdens coupled with ambiguities in New York City law result in
increased transaction costs.
76

§ 3-211(c)(3)(vi)(A).
See id.
78
Jake Simpson, Pension IAs Face Lobbyist Label, Burden, COMPLIANCE REPORTER
1, 11 (April 25, 2011), http://www.iinews.com/site/rss/CR042511.pdf (“‘In some cases the
deputy officials or the officials themselves may appear at a final presentation even if the
negotiations were conducted by their staff, and it’s unclear if that would negate the exemption,’ said Edward Pittman, partner with Dechert.”).
79
Applies to “persons who attempt to influence determinations of the boards of
trustees of the City’s five pension funds about investments of the pension funds.” See
Letter from Patrick Synmoie, supra note 12.
80
Id.
81
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(1). See also Letter from Patrick Synmoie,
supra note 12.
82
See N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-2, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html
/lobbying/2011-2.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op.
2011-3, http://cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/lobbying/2011-3.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
83
SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7.
77
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2. Registration and Reporting Requirements
Pursuant to section 3-213 of the New York City Administrative Code,
lobbyists must file statements of registration annually.84 The statement of
registration has an income and expenditure threshold.85 Specifically, the
regulation does not require “any lobbyist who in any year does not expend,
incur or receive an amount in excess of five thousand dollars of reportable
compensation and expenses ... for the purposes of lobbying.”86 As the $5,000
threshold is to be applied cumulatively to expenditures and compensation
related to all an investment adviser’s clients, the threshold is quite low given
the expenses and compensation associated with marketing to any of New
York City’s five pension plans.87 For example, throughout the course of
fundraising and marketing to investors, including pension plans, investment
adviser employees will undoubtedly encounter expenses, including travel
costs to and from meetings, lodging requirements, meals, etc.
Individuals who reasonably anticipate reaching the $5,000 compensation threshold by December 15th must register for the upcoming year and
must comply with ongoing reporting requirements.88 The term “reportable
compensation” is not defined in the Administrative Code. While “reported
compensation” is not defined, “compensation” is defined as “any salary, fee,
gift, payment, subscription, loan, advance or anything of value paid, owed,
given or promised by the client to the lobbyist for the purpose of lobbying.”89
Under section 3-216 lobbyists must file periodic reports including: (i) up to
six bi-monthly Periodic Reports; (ii) Lobbyist Annual Report; (iii) up to six
Fundraising/Political Consulting Reports; and (iv) Termination Report(s).90
Therefore, once an investment adviser meets the relatively low $5,000
threshold, he is subject to a slew of burdensome reporting requirements.
3. Lobbyist Prohibitions—Contingent Compensation, Gifts,
and Payments
New York City regulations prohibit contingent compensation—compensation that is dependent upon whether public pension plan assets are
84

N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-213(a)(1).
Id.
86
Id.
87
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(f).
88
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-213(a)(1). As of January 1, 2014, New York City
Administrative Code has increased the threshold from $2,000 to $5,000.
89
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(e).
90
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-216(a)(1), (2)-(b)(3), (4).
85
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awarded.91 This prohibition directly bans placement agents92 from taking
contingency fees when doing business with New York City pension plans.
The contingent compensation prohibition is clearly targeted at placement
agents and does not apply to salaried investment adviser employees.93 With
respect to gifts and payments, New York City prohibits any person required
to register as a lobbyist from giving or offering to give a gift to any public
servant.94 The terms “payment” and “gift” include anything that has “any
value whatsoever, whether in the form of money, service, loan, travel, entertainment, hospitality, thing or promise, or in any other form.”95 As in most
jurisdictions, even jurisdictions that have not enacted specific pay-to-play
legislation, gifts to public officials are prohibited. The analysis of gift policy
will not be a focus of this Note.
4. Penalties
Most investment advisers dealing with New York City pension plans
will likely act conservatively and preemptively register, in order to ensure
compliance with lobbyist disclosure reporting regulations. Even the threat of
a legal proceeding or violation of regulatory laws creates reputational damage and hinders sales activities.96 If an investment adviser or its personnel fail
to comply with the lobbying laws, they are subject to penalties. A knowing or
willful violation is considered a Class A misdemeanor and subject to civil
penalty of up to $30,000 and/or subject to an order to cease all lobbying activities for up to sixty days.97 Failure to file a Statement of Registration pursuant to section 3-213 is also a Class A misdemeanor and subject to a civil
penalty of up to $20,000.98 The monetary penalty is certainly consequential
and serves as a deterrent; however, the cessation of lobbying activities and
91

See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-218 (“No client shall retain or employ any
lobbyist for compensation, the rate or amount of which compensation in whole or in part
is contingent or dependent upon legislative, executive, or administrative action where efforts by a lobbyist to influence such action are subject to the jurisdiction of the city clerk,
and no person shall accept such a retainer or employment.”).
92
See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7.
93
Placement agents are paid when they successfully “place” investors with investment
advisers. Placement agents are paid a “finder fee” that is contingent upon the successful
matching of an investor and an investment adviser.
94
See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-225.
95
N.Y.C., N.Y., Rules, 53 Tit. § 1-16(b)(5) (2012).
96
See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 7. “Because a proceeding against a firm for
failing to register could hinder sales activities to the City’s pension boards, registration may
be advisable.” Id.
97
See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-223(a).
98
Id.
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reputational damage likely to ensue are the more significant factors investment advisers will consider in complying with New York City’s lobbying
laws.99 The prospect of reputational damage and a civil penalty, together,
renders compliance with the reporting requirements a cost of doing business
for these investment advisors.
B. California Law
1. Definition of Lobbyist
California amended its existing lobbying laws such that placement agents
and investment advisers marketing to any of California’s state public retirement plans100 may fall under California’s definition of lobbyist.101 California
expanded the definition of the term “placement agent” and treats such individuals or entities as lobbyists for certain purposes.102 Individuals, including
internal investment manager personnel, and entities that are involved in soliciting or finding investment management business, including fund investments, from California state public retirement systems are thus subject to
California’s state lobbying laws and regulations.103 California’s lobbyist
definition includes two categories of covered persons: placement agents and
investment manager personnel.104 A placement agent is any person hired or
engaged on behalf of an external manager or another placement agent, who
earns compensation as a type of “finder, solicitor, marketer, consultant,
broker or other intermediary” in connection with any type of sale of securities either, directly or indirectly.105 With respect to investment manager
personnel, its definition includes all employees “whose activities include
soliciting or marketing to California public retirement systems and to third
party investment managers who manage certain investment funds of which
99

See generally Greg Wolski & Virginia Adams, Anti-corruption Considerations for
Private Equity Firms, ERNST & YOUNG, available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document
/view/12410162/anti-corruption-considerations-for-private-equity-firms-ernst-young (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (discussing reputational risks associated with corruption).
100
State public retirement plans include CalPERS, CalSTRS, and the University of
California pension system. See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2.
101
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013).
102
Id.
103
Lobbyist Laws May Significantly Impact Marketing of Funds and Advisory Services
to California and New York City Plans in 2011, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP 1 (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www.srz.com/files/News/adc95517-90e6-4cc3-9201-36153ba4f951/Presen
tation/NewsAttachment/e8af7c80-49fb-47c0-b191-364d7f12c6a4/020311_Lobbyist_Laws
_May_Significantly_Impact_Marketing_of_Funds_and_Advisory_Services.pdf.
104
See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2. This varies from New York City’s definition of lobbyist, which has a separate categorization for placement agents.
105
Id. at 2 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013)).
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public pension funds are majority owners.”106 On its face, the definition of
lobbyist, by possibly expanding to include placement agents and investment
manager personnel, includes any employee who participates in any soliciting or marketing activity directed at government.
Despite the explicit list of the types of personnel who may be “covered”
by the lobbying laws, the law does not clarify which activities constitute solicitation or marketing. In turn, this lack of clarification creates ambiguity in
determining who is a “covered” person. Materials published by the California
Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) emphasize that business or investment contact between investment adviser employees and state public retirement system personnel is a key criterion for determining what activity is
covered.107 Yet the FPPC guidance still leaves ambiguities, and neither the
statute nor legislative history provides clarification of the level or type of
contact that would render an individual to be “soliciting” or “marketing.”108
Confusion arises in determining whether contact is merely official in nature,
and whether contact that occurs to responses to due diligence inquiries qualifies as soliciting or marketing. As such, employees whose principal responsibilities involve sales, marketing, or investor relations most likely qualify as
“covered,” such that they qualify as lobbyists under the regulation as soon
as they begin contacting state public retirement system personnel in any way
that relates to potential business.109 Organizations, whose employees are
“covered” by the lobbying laws, are deemed a “Lobbyist Employer”110 and
must comply with regulations for “Lobbyist Employers.”111 This is yet another layer of compliance that further increases transaction costs.
2. Registration and Reporting Requirements
California’s law contains reporting requirements that further complicate
compliance with various pay-to-play regulations.112 Individuals who are
106

Id. at 2 (emphasis added); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(a) (West 2013).
See, e.g., The Lobbying Provisions of the Political Reform Act, Cal. Fair Political
Practices Comm’n Asst. Gen. Counsel Op. 11-1031 4 (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.fppc
.ca.gov/index.php?id=545&zoom_query=lobbyists+contact+public+retirement+system+per
sonnel&zoom_cat=21&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=0&zoom_sort=0 (click on document “11-031”).
108
See Placement Agents, 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 668 (A.B. 1743) (West), available
at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB1743&
search_keywords=; Cary J. Meer et al., California Regulates Investment Managers’ Placement Agents and Solicitors as Lobbyists, K & L GATES 2 (Nov. 2010), http://m.klgates.com
/files/Publication/fd5d02d6-dda1-4c15-bb4c-01181806bb70/Presentation/PublicationAttach
ment/7b06f446-2656-4eb6-a085-0af45ac5d8ef/IM_alert_111710.pdf.
109
See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2.
110
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039.5(a)–(b) (West 2013).
111
See Form 635, Report of Lobbyist Employer and Report of Lobbying Coalition, CAL.
SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/forms/form-635.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
112
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039.5(a).
107
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lobbyists must file quarterly reports—Form 615113—to their employers
within two weeks after each calendar quarter ends.114 The report includes
disclosure of matters actively lobbied, itemization of activity expenses incurred or arranged during the quarter, and a description of political contributions of $100 or more.115
Lobbyist employers’ reports focus on payments to and from lobbyist
employees. Employers of lobbyists must file a report on Form 635 along
with their Lobbyist employees’ Forms 615 by the end of the month following each calendar quarter-end.116 The Form 635 requires disclosure with respect to payments made in connection with lobbying activities, portion of
salaries paid to employees who are lobbyists, and identification of lobbyist
routine expenses and similar payments made to influence legislative or administrative action.117 Lobbyist employers are responsible for having a recordkeeping system to ensure the accuracy and reliability of all information
related to lobbying activity.118 In addition to the reporting requirements, lobbyists must attend mandatory ethics training that is only offered in California
and not offered online.119 The mandatory ethics training is an extraordinary
cost, in terms of both time and money, for investment advisers. The Forms
615 and 635 place a large disclosure burden on both lobbyists and their employers, creating unnecessarily high transaction costs as a result.
3. Lobbyist Prohibitions—Contingent Compensation, Gifts,
and Payments
California law bars contingent compensation.120 Specifically, lobbyists
and their employers are prohibited from making “any payment in any way
contingent upon the defeat, enactment, or outcome of any proposed legislative or administrative action.”121 Under the new regulations, this contingent
113

See Lobbying Quarterly Disclosure Reports—Forms Required, CAL. SEC’Y
http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/lobbying-info/filing-requirements/required-docs-lob
-quarterly.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (providing a complete list of lobbying reports
required by California).
114
See Form 615, Lobbyist Report, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, www.sos.ca.gov/prd/forms
/form-615.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
115
Id.
116
See Form 635, supra note 111.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See AB 1743 Fact Sheet Placement Agents: Lobbying Registration Requirements,
CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N 1, 3 (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.fppc.ca.gov
/factsheets/009-122010PlacementAgentFS.pdf.
120
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86205(f) (West 2013).
121
Id.
OF STATE,

262

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:243

compensation ban applies to both activities of placement agents and “covered” investment management personnel.122 In this respect, the California ban
is similar to the New York City prohibition on contingent compensation.123
California’s regulation only allows nominal gifts and payments made
by lobbyists. Lobbyists are prohibited from making political contributions to
officers of the state agency with whom the lobbyist is registered to lobby.124
For example, a lobbyist registered in California is prohibited from making
political contributions to any California state candidate, such as a California
State Senator or California Governor.125 Specifically, the law bars the making
of gifts over $10 per month to any such officials of any government agency
to whom the lobbyist is registered to lobby.126 Both the contingent compensation ban and the regulations regarding gifts and payments are fairly consistent across states;127 therefore, while the inclusion of this information is
helpful to provide a full picture of the lobbying laws, it is not of particular
importance with respect to the analysis in this Note.
4. Penalties
Failure to comply with California’s lobbyist regulations results in both a
monetary fine and a ban from soliciting new business.128 First, any knowing
or willful violation of the provision is a misdemeanor.129 Second, the monetary penalty is “[a] fine of up to the greater of $10,000 or three times the
amount the person failed to report properly or unlawfully contributed, expended, gave, or received.”130 Third, the failure to comply with regulations
results in a ban from soliciting new business from the retirement system, or
any government agency, for five years.131 The fine and the ban from soliciting new business, while significant statutory penalties, are probably less of
a concern than the reputational damage an investment adviser might incur
by facing a penalty or paying a settlement.132
122

See SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 2.
Id. at 2, 5, 7.
124
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2013).
125
Id.
126
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86203 (West 2013).
127
See supra Part II.B.3, Part II.C.3.
128
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(a)-(b) (West 2013); SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31,
at 6.
129
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(a).
130
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91000(b).
131
SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 6.
132
See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, ‘Pay to Play’ Pact Yields $24 Million for New Mexico,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013, 6:50 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788
123
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C. New York versus California Prototypes
While previous sections of this Note set the background of New York
City and California’s lobbyist regulations for investment advisers, both laws
contain exemptions that further confuse identifying which activity constitutes
lobbying and which firm personnel are subject to regulation. Comparison of
the relevant exemptions side-by-side helps demonstrate the significant differences in the two regulatory methods and the complexities investment advisers
face while interpreting the regulations. Analysis reveals that both prototypes
fail to achieve their purpose because their definitions of lobbying activity
and purported exemptions are unclear. The resultant maze of definitions and
exemptions to those in the industry increases the cost of doing business to a
debilitating extent.
Pay-to-play regulations are constantly evolving. More and more states
are adopting laws impacting marketing from investment advisers to pension
plans. Industry professionals have suggested the regulatory situation in New
York is complicated because city officials re-interpreted existing law rather
than making new rules.133 For example, New York City Administrative Code
section 3-211(c)(vi)(A) provides an exception for “contractors or prospective
contractors who communicate with or appear before city contracting officers
or employees in the regular course of procurement planning ... [or] city contracting officers or employees in the regular course of the administration of
a contract are not engaged in lobbying.”134 The problem arises from the fact
that this exception does not clarify which activity qualifies as in the “regular
course” of procurement planning or administration of a contract. The Office
of the City Clerk has issued several advisory opinions that attempt to clarify
the meaning of the exemptions. In an advisory opinion, the City Clerk determined that “communications between investment managers, who have been
solicited through the procurement process,”135 in the regular course of procurement planning fall within the exception. This exception is contingent
7323864304578320453711310538.html; Chad Bray, Adviser, Lobbyist to Pay $1.5
Million in Pay-to-Play Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504576007592042897326.html. See also supra
Part II.A.4.
133
See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text. New York City Lobbying Bureau
regularly issues advisory opinions, which are available on their website. In 2011 the New
York City Lobbying Bureau issued two advisory opinions discussing exceptions to the
obligation to register as a lobbyist for marketing to pension funds.
134
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-211(c)(3)(vi)(A) (2014).
135
N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-3, supra note 82 (explaining the proper
procurement procedures for selecting investment advisers and issues of request for proposals (RFP)).
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upon whether the communication is through the procurement process136 or
in response to requests for proposals.137 Second, the City Clerk determined
that communications between employees of investment managers that have
an existing contract with a fund are not lobbying.138 Despite the continued
ambiguities seemingly acknowledged by the Office of City Clerk, New
York City’s regulatory agency remains steadfast in threatening to enhance
scrutiny on the investment activities.139
California law contains two exemptions around onerous lobbying requirements that make its law more reasonable than New York City’s Administrative Code. First, the one-third exemption covers internal adviser firm
personnel who spend at least one-third of their time on portfolio management.
Second, the competitive bidding exception covers internal personnel of registered advisers who will be selected through a competitive bidding process
and has agreed to a fiduciary standard of care.140 The one-third exemption
states that the definition of “placement agents” does not include an investment manager’s employees who spend at least one-third of their time during
a calendar year “managing the securities or assets owned, controlled, invested
or held by the [investment] manager.”141 With these exclusions, an investment adviser can skirt the lobbyist registration requirement by limiting
involvement in solicitation of California public retirement system business
to internal personnel who satisfy the one-third exemption.
136

See 4 THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 8 (N.Y. Legal Publ’n Corp. 2011),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/mocs/ppb/downloads/pdf/April2010rulesmodifiedMar2011pdf (defining procurement as: “Buying, purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise acquiring any
goods, services, or construction. It also includes all functions that pertain to the obtaining
of any good, service, or construction, including planning, description of requirements,
solicitation and selection of sources, preparation and award of contract, and all phases of
contract administration, including receipt and acceptance, evaluation of performance, and
final payment.”).
137
See N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-2, supra note 82 (“It is the determination of the City Clerk that persons who attempt to influence the Pension Funds’ decisions to
enter into limited partnership agreements or contracts for alternative investments such as real
estate investment funds, private equity funds, and hedge funds are engaged in ‘lobbying’
or a ‘lobbying activity’ as defined in the Administrative Code. However, if those persons
are responding to a request for information by the staff of the Comptroller’s office or a
Pension Fund they would not be engaged in ‘lobbying’ or a ‘lobbying activity’ because
such communications are exempt under Administrative Code § 3-211(c)(3)(v).”).
138
N.Y.C. Office of the City Clerk Op. 2011-3, supra note 82.
139
Letter from Patrick Synmoie, supra note 12 (“Beginning in January 2011, this office
will be reviewing the activities of individuals, businesses, and organizations that, as of
January 1, 2011, are attempting to influence investment decisions made by pension funds
and retirement systems of New York City. Parties that fail to comply with the Lobbying
Law will be subject to … penalties ....”).
140
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c) (West 2013).
141
Id.
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While the one-third exemption makes California’s lobbying law more
manageable for investment advisers, it still leaves several ambiguities.
First, the exemption does not specify how to measure the “calendar year.”142
If the exclusion is interpreted literally, then the investment adviser must have
spent at least a full calendar year managing assets for one-third of his or her
time in order for the exclusion to apply. If so, then the exclusion is unavailable for employees at new firms or newly hired employees. Other situations,
such as employees hired laterally who were working in investment advisory
roles previously, reveal the complications that can arise from interpreting this
exemption. However, a more flexible standard is readily available: make the
calendar year requirement subject to a good faith projection of the investment professional’s estimated allocation of yearly assigned duties and historical responsibilities.143 Assembly Bill 1743 is the bill that amended existing
California law to expand the definition of lobbyist and require reporting
standards.144 Neither AB 1743,145 its legislative history,146 nor the FPPC
offer any guidance regarding how to interpret the calendar year requirement.
Furthermore, in opinions distributed by law firms, it is suggested that “because the ‘placement agent’ definition applies so differently than the traditional ‘lobbyist’ definition, analogies drawn from FPPC’s existing guidance
may not be helpful” in interpreting the calendar year rule.147 A second ambiguity is that the one-third exemption does not identify which particular
activities fall under the description of managing assets. An individual whose
position includes creating the investment fund’s portfolio and deciding which
securities to invest is a clear example of an employee whose responsibilities
fall within the description of “managing assets.”148 In contrast, it is less clear
whether “managing assets” includes the majority of individuals whose responsibilities are related to managing assets but are not responsible for the
actual investment decision.
The competitive bidding exception under section 82047.3 of California
Code provides that investment firm personnel are excluded from the “placement agent” definition, with respect to public retirement system contacts if
the investment adviser:
(i) is registered with the SEC or an appropriate state regulator as an investment adviser or broker-dealer; (ii) has been selected through a
competitive bidding process subject to specified California laws and is
142
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providing services pursuant to a contract executed as a result of that
competitive bidding process; and (iii) has agreed to a fiduciary standard
of care as to the state public retirement system’s investments.149

While California’s exclusions from the lobbyist definition leave fewer
ambiguities than New York City’s exemptions, both jurisdictions’ laws create confusion as to what particular activity constitutes lobbying under the
statutes. California and New York City’s regulations have paved the way for
other states to police the interaction between pension funds and investment
advisers.150 As such, the analysis above involves only two jurisdictions and
does not reflect a complete picture of the regulatory environment in which
investment advisers market to public pension plans. The next Part provides
a sampling of developments in other states’ legislatures and of internal regulations by public pension plans to provide a more accurate picture of the
many layers of lobbying laws challenging investment advisers. As the layers
build on top of already ambiguous predecessors, the transactional costs for
dealing in this environment continue to grow.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
& PENSION PLAN REGULATIONS
A. Development of Laws in Other States
In reviewing the development of lobbying laws in other states, it is interesting to note that many of the regulations do not follow the precedent
established by the New York City or California prototypes, but rather, states
are taking their own approaches to regulate the interaction between investment advisers and government pension plans. This variance in states’ laws
further complicates and confuses the regulatory environment.
1. Ohio
While New York City and California expanded their definitions of
lobbyist to include certain investment adviser activities, Ohio created a separate category to define the interaction between investment advisers and
public pension plans, labeled as “retirement system lobbying activity.”151
Ohio Code defines retirement system lobbying activity as:
contacts made to promote, oppose, reward, or otherwise influence the
outcome of a retirement system decision by direct communication with
149

Id. at 3 (discussing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82047.3(c) (West 2013)).
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a member of a board of a state retirement system, a state retirement system investment official, or an employee of a state retirement system
whose position involves substantial and material exercise of discretion in
the investment of retirement system funds.152

The Ohio regulation sets forth clear parameters for which activity qualifies as lobbying the retirement system.153 From the language in the statute,
certain investment advisers marketing to the Ohio Retirement System are
“influenc[ing] the outcome of a retirement ... decision” and are in direct communication with personnel whose “position involves ... material exercise of
discretion in the investment of retirement system funds.”154
The Ohio regulation differs from the New York City and California prototypes in that it creates a distinct category and definition for retirement
system lobbying.155 Whether the investment adviser’s employee qualifies as
a retirement system lobbyist depends upon whether the employee is in direct
communication with a retirement system employee with “material exercise”
over the system’s assets.156 In reality, most pension plan employees with
whom investment firm employees communicate will likely fall under this
qualification, permitting only communications between purely administrative
personnel. The separate category of “retirement system lobbyists” allows
for a tailored approach to reporting requirements, only requiring disclosures
and information that pertain to public pension plans and investment advisers.
But nonetheless, the determination hinges on whether the employee has
“material exercise” over system assets, which inherently contains a level
of ambiguity.
2. Texas
In Texas, investment advisers have discretion over whether to register as
a lobbyist, even if they meet the spending threshold definition.157 Unlike
Ohio, the Texas Code does not create a new category for retirement system
lobbying activity. As such, investment advisers marketing to public pension
plans in Texas must interpret existing law to determine whether their activity
falls within the legislature’s interpretation of the term lobbyist.158 The code
152
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requires an investment adviser to register as a lobbyist if, “as part of his regular employment, [the employee] has communicated directly with a member
of the legislative or executive branch to influence legislation or administrative action ... whether or not the person receives any compensation for the
communication in addition to the salary for that regular employment.”159
Texas uses a threshold approach and requires registration if an adviser
exceeds the spending threshold of $200 in a calendar quarter.160 The $200
threshold applies to an employee’s total expenditure or if an employee receives, or is entitled to receive, compensation for activities to communicate
with a member of the executive or legislative branch to influence legislative
or administrative actions.161 The threshold excludes the employee’s own
travel, food, or lodging expenses.162 While the threshold approach provides
certainty, the approach does not seek to regulate the underlying activity itself. The Texas Code only specifies that communication with the legislative
or executive branch qualifies as lobbying—the lobbying definition in the
Code is silent with respect to public pension plans and whether officials at
public pension plans are subject to the lobbying registration requirements.
Despite the lack of clarity in the law, investment advisers who spend greater
than $200 in connection with marketing to public pension plans in Texas
have not been categorized as lobbyists and, therefore, have discretion as to
whether to register as lobbyists.163
3. New Jersey
Unlike the Texas and Ohio approach, New Jersey defines “lobbyist”
broadly, encompassing a large spectrum of interaction with the government.
Under New Jersey law, a lobbyist is “any person ... that employs, engages or
otherwise uses the services of any governmental affairs agent to influence
legislation, regulation or governmental processes.”164 The term “influence
governmental process” is defined separately as:
any attempt, whether successful or not, to assist a represented entity or
group to engage in communication with, or to secure information from,
an officer or staff member of the Executive Branch, or any authority,
board, commission or other agency or instrumentality in or of a principal
159
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department of the Executive Branch of State Government, empowered
by law to administer a governmental process or perform other functions
that relate to such processes.165

Thus, the New Jersey statute and accompanying definitions cast a very
wide net as to what activity constitutes lobbying. Despite the broad definition,
there is no evidence that investment advisers marketing to New Jersey state
pension plans have faced any pressure to register as lobbyists.166 While this
situation could be attributed to fewer publicized scandals related to pay-toplay and New Jersey pension funds, it also could signal a trend that other jurisdictions are refusing to adopt the California and New York City prototypes.
B. Pension Plans Impose Regulations
In addition to the various state-imposed lobbying requirements, investment advisers also face regulations that are self-imposed by the public pension plans themselves. This additional layer of regulations further complicates
the regulatory environment.
1. NYSCRF
After the pay-to-play scandal in New York, the new comptroller,
Thomas P. DiNapoli, reformed the New York State Common Retirement
Fund (NYSCRF) to make it “one of the most transparent and accountable
public pension funds in the country.”167 First, DiNapoli changed the fund’s
policies, including banning pay-to-play practices, banning the use of placement agents, creating a pension fund task force, increasing internal vetting of
investments, forming a special commission of outside experts, and creating
165

Id. (defining “government process” as the: “promulgation of executive orders; rate
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mandatory ethics training.168 Second, NYSCRF increased oversight.169
The increased oversight included partnering with New York State Insurance
Department, hiring an external law firm, creating an “inspector general” position, and hiring a special counsel on ethics.170 Third, NYSCRF “increased
transparency in fund transactions” by releasing monthly reporting on investment transactions, announcing pension fund performance quarterly, and
creating a review of external investment consultants.171 Finally, NYSCRF
“[p]roposed Campaign Finance Reform” legislation.172 The increased regulations and reporting requirements are more comprehensive than the lobbying registration requirements imposed by state and local governments.
2. CalPERS
Similar to NYSCRF, CalPERS self-imposed enhanced investment protocols and increased regulations. In reaction to the CalPERS’ scandal discussed in Part I, CalPERS took “aggressive steps ... to strengthen the pension
fund’s accountability and ethics, and to ensure full transparency.”173 These
steps included delegating investment decisions to the Chief Investment
Officer, “lifting the veil on placement agents,” setting policy for state legislation, special review of fees paid to external managers, and tightening its
own board governance rules.174 CalPERS’ policies on placement agents led
the way in placement agent disclosure rules and resulted in the co-sponsorship
of the legislation discussed in Part II.C. In addition to enhancing governing
policies, CalPERS increased transparency by putting key investment documents online and was the first public pension fund to disclose placement agent
data, which included more than 600 placement agent disclosures obtained by
the fund from its external managers.175 As of August 1, 2012, CalPERS and
CalSTERS require reporting placement agent information “to the respective
chairpersons of the Assembly Committee on Public Employees, Retirement,
and Social Security and the Senate Committee on Public Employment and
Retirement.”176 CalPERS took action by ending the use of placement
agents in new deals. Thus, CalPERS took measures by not only increasing
168
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accountability and reporting requirements but also increasing transparency
by forcing external managers to disclose information.
IV. ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES & ECONOMIC COSTS
A. Economic Costs
1. Cost for Investment Advisers
Pay-to-play laws have contributed to an increasingly complex regulatory
environment for investment advisers. Investment advisers are therefore increasing their legal and compliance departments in order to deal with these
regulations.177 David Sobel, Chief Compliance Officer at Abel/Noser Corporation, has commented that “as the web of regulations has become more
complex, his workload has expanded by about 25 percent.”178 Further, pension plans expect investment advisers to have a sophisticated compliance
structure.179 Industry professionals expect to see increased legal hiring by
financial institutions to meet their compliance needs.180 Thus, investment
advisers must increase their budgets and head count to comply with the regulatory environment. “‘In the last few years, compliance has become a new
profession within financial services,’ noted Zebrowski, an attorney and CPA
who runs an alternative investment firm.”181 While a boon for lawyers and
compliance professionals, increased costs in non-profit generating departments is a cost that reduces the overall profitability of investment advisers.
Unfortunately, the increase in regulations and compliance costs do not
necessarily offset enough corruption to justify the expense.
2. Cost for SEC
The SEC has increased its budget to enforce its own pay-to-play laws and
respond to the increasingly complicated regulatory environment.182 While
the SEC is not responsible for specific jurisdictions’ pay-to-play rules, it is
177
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necessary for the SEC to understand how the jurisdiction-specific rules relate to the federal rules. In its 2012 Budget Justification, the SEC requested
funds to support its regulatory functions.183 The SEC referenced its steps over
the past two years to make it “more vigilant, agile, and responsive, and is
moving on multiple fronts to enhance its effectiveness and provide robust
oversight of the financial markets” as justification for its increased budget.184
Further, the SEC created “new senior leadership in key positions” in order
to create regulations regarding “equity market structure, credit rating agency
conflicts and disclosure, investment adviser custody controls, money market
fund resiliency, asset-backed securities, large trader reporting, pay-to-play,
and municipal securities disclosure.”185 Pay-to-play laws present a new regulatory burden to which the SEC has to respond. The SEC has “stepped up its
interest in pay-to-play cases,” and even created a specialized unit that examines corruption in government bond offerings and bringing actions against
financial institutions and public officials.186 The SEC has increased its staffing levels and budget as a result of the new regulatory workload.187
3. Cost for Pension Plans
As previously addressed, public pension plans have imposed their own
regulations regarding investment advisers and increased transparency. This
Note only briefly addresses the associated additional costs incurred by pension funds, because it is self-evident that with increased regulations, increased
filings, and increased reporting requirements come increased costs.188 To
comply with federal, state, and self-imposed regulations, pension funds
must expend large sums increasing oversight employees or hiring outside
legal counsel. For example, the NYSCRF hired outside compliance experts
183
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to conduct a compliance review of every single pension fund transaction.189
Similarly, NYSCRF releases monthly reports detailing investment transactions and hiring of investment advisers.190 Of course, the pension plans
can decide not to incur these expenses and simply rely on their current employees to meet all of these additional burdens. These increased costs,
while necessary to respond to the heightened regulatory requirements, do
not directly result in higher profit returns.
4. Transaction Costs
The increased transaction costs for public pension funds, investment
advisers, and the SEC correlate to a decrease in the returns for beneficiaries of public retirement systems. Ronald Coase developed the eponymously named Coase Theorem, which provides, assuming no transaction
costs, that parties in repeat transactions will negotiate to the most cost effective outcome.191
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure
that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the
pricing system worked without cost.192

The public pension plan and investment adviser relationship should be
one in which transaction costs are low because as Coase described, there are
repeat players, who are able to negotiate, and draw up bargains. Unfortunately, the many layers of regulations discussed in this Note create ambiguity
in the public pension plan allocation process and increase transaction costs.
Uncertainty creates increased transaction costs.193 The increased transaction
costs, partially the result of increased compliance needs for investment
189
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advisers, the SEC, and public pension plans, suggest investment returns
become more and more inefficient.
The benefit of increased regulation is the benefit from diminished corruption in the public pension plan allocation process. For pension plans, the
cost of corruption is the opportunity cost of the misallocation of funds—that
is, investing with funds who pay-to-play rather than a more ethical investment adviser who refuse to pay-to-play. For investment advisers, the costs of
corruption are reputational damages, regulatory fines, and an uneven playing field. The increased transaction costs are inefficient if they outweigh the
benefit—the corruption they prevent.
Investment advisers are forced by these regulations to update existing
compliance programs, which directly result in higher management fees or
lower cost-to-profit ratios. Pension plans devote more effort to increasing
transparency to comply with new regulatory requirements, which leads to
higher costs and lower return for beneficiaries.194 The SEC, as a result of
increased regulation and oversight measures, has incurred, and will continue to incur, incredible costs to regulate the growing uncertain investment
environment.195 A possible result of the increased costs is an environment
in which government pension plans diversify less with investment advisers
because the risk of exposure to pay-to-play scandals is too costly.196 In turn,
all of these lobbying regulations may result in a lower return for beneficiaries of public retirement systems.
B. Compliance Procedures for Investment Advisers
Public pension plans have significant assets under management, and
investment advisers associate a certain prestige with winning management
of public pension plan assets. Therefore, it is likely that investment advisers
will attempt to comply with the inefficient laws and increased transaction
costs197 to gain access to these coveted funds.198 To help investment advisers
comply with these developing laws, this Note proposes a set of compliance
procedures that most efficiently and comprehensively addresses these
194
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laws. This protocol consists of proactive planning by investment adviser
personnel, especially with respect to the legal, compliance, and investor
relations’ departments.
First, legal and compliance departments must track meetings and contact
with public pension plans. Therefore, investor relations and other personnel
that have contact with public pension plans must immediately notify legal
and compliance of any plans to contact or meet with public pension plans.
To do so, the department that schedules meetings with potential investors,
usually the investor relations department, must submit a schedule to the legal
and compliance departments identifying any planned contact with, or marketing directed at public pension plans. For clarity, this schedule will be
referred to as the “public pension plan schedule.” The public pension plan
schedule should specify the particular investment adviser personnel involved,
the type of contact, the length of contact, and the public pension plan personnel involved. This first step will ensure that any registration, if necessary,
will occur before any substantive contact commences.
Second, compliance departments must use the public pension plan
schedule to review each pension plans current state, local, and pension
specific lobbying laws. This review is similar to the analysis provided in
this Note, in that compliance department must look at the many layers of
regulations and determine if the investment adviser activity falls under the
scope of the definition of lobbying. Compliance must also look to see if
the relevant jurisdiction’s laws contain exceptions. In this review, the same
problems arise with interpreting the jurisdiction’s definitions, exceptions
and reporting requirements.
Third, after the relevant regulations are reviewed, compliance must keep
track of time and expenses associated with firm personnel who have had contact with pension plans. Investment adviser personnel who will most readily
fall into the lobbyist category are those in the investor relations, finance, and
legal departments. The time and expenses must be organized to track whether
any personnel pass the spending threshold of the particular jurisdiction’s
lobbyist regulations.199 Keeping track of the investment advisers’ marketing
plans and employees’ time and expenses is a large burden and cost, adding
to the existing responsibilities of legal and compliance departments.200 While
199
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the burden of tracking this information is significant, it is a necessary step
in order to ensure adequate compliance.
Fourth, if it is determined that any personnel qualify as lobbyists, investment advisers must then register personnel as lobbyists and comply
with the relevant lobbying reporting requirements. This step requires paying the requisite registration fees and filing the necessary forms. In addition,
some jurisdictions, like California, require lobbying and ethics training.
Again, the legal and compliance departments must track registration requirements across jurisdictions and file the necessary forms.201 This ongoing reporting requirement—requiring compliance departments to register,
file, and continually report in all relevant jurisdictions—is a truly burdensome transaction cost.202
Furthermore, as the law is ever evolving and political positions are constantly changing, the duty to monitor continually persists. If an investment
adviser already conducts business with a particular public pension plan that
previously did not require lobbyist registration but now requires registration, the investment adviser may need to register in that jurisdiction. Legal
and compliance departments are thus charged with the duty to preemptively
monitor state laws for updates.203 Investment advisers, and their covered employees, are prohibited from making any political contribution to any state
candidate or politician affiliated with a public pension plan whose assets
an investment adviser seeks to manage. Furthermore, investment advisers
must monitor political contributions and shifts in political ambitions. For
instance, if a governor of a state, for example California, were to run for
president of the United States, investment advisers would be prohibited from
making a political contribution to the presidential campaign if they do business with any state public pension plan in California.204 Thus, legal and
compliance departments must ensure that a political contribution is not
associated with a candidate who is a state politician in a state in which the
has increased of late due to, for example, the need to comply with the new ‘pay to play’
rule restricting political contributions by certain advisers.”).
201
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investment adviser seeks to do business.205 This must be monitored through
searching covered employees’ political contributions and then determining
whether there is a conflict.206
While the proposed compliance protocol is a hefty burden and creates
more work,207 it is necessary for investment advisers to take proactive and
preemptive efforts to comply with local and state lobbying laws. Without an
adequate compliance protocol, investment advisers are vulnerable to violating the numerous pay-to-play laws, and could be forced to endure bad
publicity and pay high settlement costs.208 The reputational consequences
alone serve as a strong incentive for investment firms to incur the necessary
compliance costs.209
CONCLUSION
The development of state laws requiring investment advisers who
market to public pension plans to register as lobbyists is significant in that
it establishes a legal precedent that does not clearly achieve its purpose and
results in an economically detrimental outcome. The prototypes created by
New York City and the State of California both attempt to increase transparency and reporting requirements for investment advisers in order to
avoid the repeat of scandals and blatant corruption that propelled the payto-play to legislation. Both prototypes fail to achieve their purpose because
their definitions of lobbying activity and purported exemptions are unclear.
The development of lobbying laws in other states further complicates the
regulatory environment investment advisers face when marketing to public
pension plans. Public pension plans have also implemented their own selfimposed restrictions in order to protect themselves, their beneficiaries, and
garner public confidence.
Unfortunately, the influx of regulations does the very opposite of what
it sets forth to achieve: the four levels of regulation create uncertainty. The
lobbying regulations increase disclosure requirements, but because it is unclear who qualifies as a lobbyist, the disclosures fail to paint a clear picture
of investment adviser activity, provide adequate transparency, or directly
205
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prevent corruption. Furthermore, the various disclosure requirements result
in an overflow of information that is insignificant because it simply reports
permitted expenses and does not illustrate the overarching picture. As
demonstrated above, not only do the increased regulations fail to achieve
their purpose, they also place a financial burden on investment advisers, the
SEC, and public pension plans. This financial burden increases transaction
costs and creates a less efficient return for the beneficiaries of the public
pension plans and the economy at large.
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